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Abstract 
 
This paper investigates how gender discrimination depends on the social identities of interacting parties. 
We use data from economic decision-making experiments to identify gender discrimination and 
randomly matched 2,836 male and female students pursuing bachelors-equivalent degrees in three 
different types of institutions that represent distinct identities within the Pakistani society. Our main 
finding is that gender discrimination is not uniform in intensity and nature across educated Pakistani 
society and varies as a function of the social identity of both individuals who interact. While we find no 
evidence of higher socio-economic status men discriminating against women, men of lower socio-
economic status and higher religiosity tend to discriminate against women –but only women from lower 
socio-economic status who are closest to them in social distance. Moreover, this discrimination seems to 
be largely taste-based. 
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1. Introduction 
Gender-unequal treatment in developing countries – be it in educational attainment, labor market 
earnings, or asset ownership–is well documented (e.g., Sen 2001; Duflo 2012). Beyond the implication 
for women’s well-being, this unequal treatment also has ramifications for the economic development of 
these countries. For example, the International Monetary Fund reports that reducing the gender wage 
gap in the Middle East, North Africa, Afghanistan and Pakistan region to levels twice as large as those 
found in emerging markets could generate extra GDP of $1 trillion in a decade to the region.
1
 In this 
paper, we use economic decision-making experiments from Pakistan to investigate (i) whether and how 
young educated Pakistani women of heterogeneous backgrounds are discriminated against by socially 
disparate groups of highly-educated young men, (ii) evaluate the nature of this discrimination (taste-
based versus statistical), and (iii) analyze how the nature of the discrimination varies by the social status 
of both genders. 
We focus on Pakistani society because gender inequality is particularly pronounced in South 
Asia. Klasen (1994) and Sen (2001) have highlighted Pakistan as a country where this imbalance is the 
starkest, with a population sex ratio most recently estimated to be 108.5 males for every 100 females 
(Pakistan Census Organization 1998). In the labor market, women aged 20 to 30 with a college degree 
earn on average 28% less than their male counterparts.
2
 Moreover, gender discrimination in Pakistan 
appears paradoxical, with women having on the one hand prominent political leadership (e.g., Pakistan’s 
former Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto was the first woman to lead an Islamic state) but facing severe 
discrimination on the other hand: for example, an estimated 13 percent of women are “missing,”  the 
gender gap in literacy is increasing, the rate of violence against women is alarming, and the female labor 
force participation rate is 15%, which is low compared to other countries with similar GDP per capita 
(Klasen and Wink 2003; Coleman 2004; Human Right Commission of Pakistan 2008).   
To investigate the interplay between gender discrimination and social identity, we recruited 
2,836 students pursuing bachelors-equivalent degrees, from three types of educational institutions in 
urban Pakistan that represent three very different identities in terms of socioeconomic background, 
religiosity and exposure to Western ideas. Our focus on interactions of inter-elite groups, defined as 
college-level students, is of particular interest because individuals belonging to these groups are likely to 
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 Source: The Express Tribune from Nov. 12 2013, available at http://tribune.com.pk/story/630894/imf-urges-pakistan-mena-
central-asia-cut-gender-gap-to-boost-gdp/. 
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become policy makers or be influential in their communities. We use the student’s institutional 
affiliation as a measure of his/her social identity. Our definition of social status is therefore based on real 
groups rather than induced groups (as, for example, in Fershtman and Gneezy 2001; Goette et al. 2006; 
Haimanti and Dugar 2014). The first type of institution consists of male-only Madrassas (religious 
seminaries). The Madrassa curriculum uses ancient religious texts and does not impart any secular 
teaching. The second type of institution—Islamic Universities—teach a Liberal Arts curriculum 
combined with Islamic teachings in gender-segregated campuses. The third type are Liberal Universities 
which are similar to American universities— campuses are mixed, classes are taught in English and 
students are widely exposed to Western ideas. While Madrassas tend to be free and hence cater 
primarily to the poor, Islamic Universities are usually public and are therefore accessible to low and 
middle income groups. Liberal Universities, on the other hand, charge expensive tuition and thus serve 
the wealthy segment of the population. On the socioeconomic status (SES) scale, students at Liberal 
Universities rank on average highest, followed by Islamic University students, with Madrassa students 
being the lowest on this scale. In addition, these three groups also differ in their levels of religiosity. 
Self-reported religiosity (on a scale from 0 to 10) is 9.2 among the Madrassa students, 6.3 among male 
Islamic University students and 5.3 among the male Liberal University students.   
To investigate gender discrimination, we study a particular aspect of social and economic 
interactions: trust. Our focus on trust stems from a large literature showing that trust enhances efficiency 
and promotes economic growth, financial development and production efficiency (e.g., Knack and 
Keefer 1997; La Porta et al. 1997; Guiso et al. 2004, Özer et al. 2014). Moreover, trust is particularly 
important in developing countries where, because of the failure of the state, informal and traditional 
institutions matter considerably more (Ostrom 1990; Fukuyama 1995). In fact, evidence points to 
economic development being highly correlated with the ability to trust and cooperate with strangers 
(Buchan et al. 2009). We measure trust by randomly matching students with each other (based on gender 
and institutional affiliation—our measure of their social identity) to participate in a trust game (Berg et 
al. 1995). In the trust game, a player (sender) can decide to send (“invest”) money to a partner (receiver). 
If the sender invests the money, the experimenter triples that amount and gives it to the receiver, who is 
asked to choose whether (s)he transfers any money back to the sender. Systematic differences in the 
decision to invest the money based on the gender of the partner would imply gender discrimination. This 
type of game captures important behavioral aspects of social and economic interactions, including those 
taking place in the labor market, and is therefore well suited to investigate gender discrimination.  
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Effective policies to address discrimination cannot be crafted without understanding the nature 
of discrimination, i.e., whether it is motivated by preferences (taste-based discrimination) or statistical 
inference on payoff-relevant information (statistical discrimination). For this purpose, we use a multiple-
game design. We also ask respondents to participate in other experiments of decision-making that 
measure expected trustworthiness (expectations in the trust game) and unconditional other-regarding 
behavior such as altruism or inequity aversion (dictator game). In the dictator game, the sender is asked 
to split an amount of money between himself and another player, who takes no further action. Therefore, 
systematic differences in the amount sent to males and females in the dictator game measure taste-based 
discrimination (Becker 1957). In the trust game, expectations about how much participants expect back 
on average from their partner allow us to measure whether the discrimination is statistical. 
 Our main finding is that the intensity and the nature of gender discrimination depend on the 
social identity of both individuals in the match. Liberal University male students, who are (on average) 
the wealthiest, least religious and most exposed to Western ideas, do not discriminate against women of 
any social identity. Madrassa students, who come from more humble backgrounds, and are more 
religious and relatively unexposed to Western ideas, tend to discriminate against Islamic University (that 
is, middle SES) women but not Liberal University (high SES) women in the trust game. Moreover, this 
discrimination is entirely taste-based. However, although Madrassa students treat men relatively better 
than women, because they give and trust more than other male groups, they actually treat women the 
best in absolute terms. Finally, Islamic University male students, who fare in the middle in terms of 
wealth and religiosity, have a less uniform behavior: they favor Liberal University (high SES) females 
but they do not favor Islamic University females (middle SES), compared to their respective male 
counterparts, in the trust game. Importantly, while we cannot rule out taste-based discrimination playing 
some role, the differential behavior by gender of Islamic University students is primarily attributable to 
statistical discrimination.  
These findings are in contrast to what we find in Delavande and Zafar (2015) in which we use 
the same experiments and the same institutions but focus on male-to-male interactions: the behavior of 
our male respondents matched with male partners does not differ by the institution of their match, i.e., 
social identity is irrelevant in the male-male interactions. In particular, there is no evidence of in- or out- 
group bias for madrassa students interacting with males from other segments of the Pakistani society. 
Moreover, counter to common stereotypes (as well as those of our sample), male Madrassa students are 
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found to exhibit the most other-regarding and trusting behavior. So in this context, social identity 
matters only in the male-female interactions.
3
 
It has been argued that pushing for policies favoring economic development, such as education 
policy, will lead to an improvement in women’s rights and status (Doepke and Tertilt 2009, Duflo 
2012). Our findings, based on a subject pool where all respondents are pursuing bachelors-equivalent 
degrees (and hence belong to an elite group in the society), that higher socioeconomic status females 
(Liberal University females) are not discriminated against and are even favored in some instances by 
males, and that women of (relatively) lower socioeconomic status (Islamic University females) are 
discriminated against by certain groups of men suggests that educating women may not be a sufficient 
condition for women’s position to improve, as their social identities continue to matter. This further 
suggests that social policies aimed at improving women’s under-representation in the political sphere or 
the labor market through gender quotas (e.g., Beaman et al. 2009, Beath et al. 2013, Bertrand et al. 
2014) may need to account for the interaction of gender with social identity, and possibly allocate 
gender quotas based on the socio-economic background of women. 
Our paper complements the large body of empirical evidence on gender unequal treatment in 
South Asia
 
(e.g. Qian 2008; Duflo 2012), with a specific focus on the role of the social identities of the 
interacting parties, for which, as discussed above, the evidence is mixed for within-household 
interactions, and scant beyond intra-household interactions. Our paper also relates to a large literature on 
gender discrimination in the labor market and other market interactions, mostly in developed countries 
(see Altonji and Blank 1999, and List and Rasul 2011 for a review). Audit studies or sex-blind hiring 
(e.g., Ayres and Siegelman 1995; Neumark 1996; Goldin and Rouse 2000) and estimates of differential 
marginal productivity (Hellerstein et al. 1999) have been used to identify gender discrimination. Due to 
lack of data, however, it is generally difficult to identify the nature of this discrimination. Recent studies 
using either field or lab experiments have been able to directly address the nature of gender 
discrimination by using a multi-game design, which is able to measure both preferences and beliefs or to 
manipulate the market under study (e.g., Fershtman and Gneezy 2001; List 2004; Slonim and Guillen 
2010;  Castillo et al. 2013). Freshtman and Gneezy (2001), whose study is the closest in approach to that 
used in this paper, match students with typical ethnic names in Israel and find strong evidence that 
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 Similar asymmetries have been found in other contexts. For example, in the US, Newton and Simutin (2014) find that older 
and male CEOs are more likely to set higher wages for male than females officers, while there is little evidence that female 
CEOs set wages according to the gender of the officer. 
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Ashkenazic women (who tend to have higher economic status) are less trusted than Ashkenazic men, 
while Eastern women (who tend to have lower economic status) are more trusted then Eastern men. This 
suggests, unlike in the Pakistani context, that discrimination against females is reduced, and even 
reversed, when they belong to lower socio-economic status groups.  
As part of the large body of empirical evidence on gender unequal treatment in South Asia,
 
there 
has been some investigation into the relationship between gender discrimination and socio-economic 
status or social class of the households. The resulting empirical evidence is however rather mixed. In 
some cases, higher economic status households are found to discriminate less against girls: Rose (1999) 
finds that landholdings increase the survival of girls relative to boys, and Behrman (1988) and Alderman 
and Gertler (1997) find that households with more income treat boys and girls more equally in terms of 
allocation of nutrients and medical care, respectively. However, Miller (1997) and Basu (1989) find that 
higher socio-economic status households (as measured by caste or income) discriminate more against 
girls, especially in the northwestern plains of Asia where the society is patrilineal. Similarly, Bhalotra 
and Cochrane (2010) show that prenatal sex detection and female foeticide are greater in relatively 
wealthy and educated families. Our paper contributes to the understanding of the relationship between 
social status and gender discrimination in South Asia beyond the one found within the household, and in 
a set-up relevant to labor markets. 
Finally, our paper is related to the sociological theory of intersectionality (Crenshaw 1991; 
Collins 2000). This theory argues that women experience discrimination in varying levels of intensity, 
which is determined by intersectional systems of society (e.g. race, ethnicity, social class). In line with 
this theory, studies have found that labor market discrimination and stereotyping tends to be worse for 
women who fall into the bottom of the social hierarchy in terms of race (Browne and Misra 2003). Our 
findings that higher socioeconomic status women in Pakistan are less discriminated against are 
consistent with this theory. 
This paper is organized as follows. We provide some background information on the institutions 
we surveyed and the sample in Section 2. Section 3 outlines a simple theoretical model that provides a 
guide for the empirical analysis. Section 4 explains the experimental design, and Section 5 presents the 
empirical results. Section 6 discusses some potential mechanisms for the findings while Section 7 
presents concluding remarks. 
 
2. Background 
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2.1. The educational institutions 
Higher education in Pakistan takes place in universities and in Madrassas (religious seminaries). 
The enrollment rate for students aged 17-23 is 5.1%. A third of the students enrolled at university are 
females (Pakistan Education Statistics 2010-11). There are now 138 universities in the country 
recognized by the Higher Education Commission, of which 75 are public and 63 private (Higher 
Education Commission Pakistan 2012). There remains considerable disagreement over the extent of the 
penetration of Madrassas because few are registered. However, Ahmad (2004) estimates that there are 
about 6,000 secondary and higher Madrassas, educating about 600,000 students. 
We conducted experiments in four male Madrassas, one public Islamic University, and two 
private Liberal Universities located in Islamabad/Rawalpindi and Lahore between May and October 
2010.
4
 Below we describe each of those institutions. 
Madrassas base their studies on texts dating to before the 14
th
 century and teach classes in Urdu 
(Fair 2006; Rahman 2008). The majority of Madrassas do not impart any secular or vocational training 
and it has been argued, albeit with scant evidence, that they deliberately educate their students in narrow 
worldviews and rejection of Western ideas, and do not train them sufficiently for the real world (Ali 
2009). Claims made by policy makers and in the popular press suggest that they may be responsible for 
fostering militancy and Islamic extremism (see discussion in Delavande and Zafar 2015). Since 
Madrassas generally tend to be free, they attract students from modest backgrounds (Rahman 2004). 
Advanced study within the Madrassas produces an Alim (Islamic scholar and/or teacher). Most students 
who graduate from a Madrassa go on to work in the religious sector.  
Islamic Universities provide a liberal arts curriculum combined with Islamic teachings and 
courses. For example, economics is taught with a focus on Islamic principles of finance. These 
universities have segregated campuses for males and females, and classes are taught in Arabic or 
English. They tend to be public and, therefore, are accessible to low and middle income groups. 
Moreover, a relatively large proportion of students at such universities have typically studied for some 
time at Madrassas before enrolling. Females account for about 40% of the student body at Islamic 
University.  
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 There are few female Madrassas, and the proportion of females pursuing a Bachelor-equivalent degree (the relevant 
population for our purposes) is even smaller. Since large sample sizes are needed for the randomizations in the experiment, 
we did not include them in our sample.  
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Liberal Universities are similar to American colleges. They provide a liberal arts curriculum, 
teach classes in English, and have gender-mixed campuses. Tuition at such institutions tends to be very 
expensive so they cater to wealthy students. Females account for about 25 to 30% of the student body at 
the two institutions we surveyed.
5
 
 
2.2. Descriptive statistics of the sample  
Data collection was conducted by the Survey Center (SC) affiliated with the Islamic University. 
The institutions in our sample are amongst the five largest and well-regarded institutions in their 
respective category in each city. Among all the institutions we contacted, one university and one 
Madrassa refused to participate. We sampled the senior-most students in the 4 Madrassas since they are 
similar in age to university students, and are pursuing degrees that are equivalent to Bachelor degrees. 
Though participation was voluntary, almost everyone in the Madrassas participated in the study. At the 
other institutions, a random sample of students (unconditional on gender) was selected to participate 
based on a listing of students provided by the registrar’s office. The average response rate at the 
universities was about 70%. To signal credibility of the study to the students, members of the staff of the 
institution at which data was being collected were also hired for the data collection. Overall 2,836 
students participated in the experiments, of which 489 were female. The ethnic composition of students 
is quite similar across the institutions.  
Table 1 presents the characteristics of the participants by group (educational affiliation) and 
gender. For comparison purpose, the table also shows the characteristics of a random sample of 
respondents from Islamabad/Rawalpindi and Lahore (City sample) obtained from a separate survey we 
conducted in 2010. The average age of students varies between 21 and 22.  
Table 1 highlights the differences across the three types of institutions.
6
 The sorting in terms of 
observables into these institutions is very drastic but as expected. As we move across the columns from 
the Liberal University (denoted by HighSES) towards the Islamic University (denoted as MidSES) and 
the Madrassas in Table 1, the average socioeconomic characteristics deteriorate. For example, the 
monthly parental income of male and female students at HighSES is about 7 times that of students in the 
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 In Delavande and Zafar (2015), we separate the two Liberal Universities we interviewed. In the present context, we find 
very similar behaviour toward females so keep them as one group to simplify the presentation of results. 
6
 Since we find no significant differences within the Madrassas either in terms of demographic characteristics or in their 
experimental behavior, we combine the four Madrassas into one group to keep the tables and analysis simple.   
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Madrassas, and father’s years of education is almost twice as many. If we compare the students to the 
City sample (last two columns of the table), we see that Madrassa students seem to come from less well-
off backgrounds than the general populations in the cities, while all other institutions fare better in terms 
of most indicators of wealth. Females at HighSES and MidSES tend to come from slightly more 
privileged backgrounds than their male counterparts: on average, they have higher parental income, 
parental education and asset ownership. This difference is more marked at MidSES.  
Students from the various groups also show different levels of self-reported religiosity and the 
number of prayers per day. Students were asked to rate how religious they considered themselves to be 
on a scale from 0 (not religious at all) to 10 (very religious). Religiosity increases as we move across 
columns of Table 1; the average religiosity is 5.6-5.7 for HighSES males and females compared to 9.2 in 
the Madrassas. The former also pray much less frequently each day (2-2.4 times vs. 4.9).  
Finally, students are exposed to different types of information and different peer groups. While 
only 23% of the Madrassa students report watching BBC and CNN, at least 59% of the students of the 
other groups report watching it. Within HighSES, female students tend to watch those international news 
channels more than male students. Also, the proportion of male respondents who have ever attended a 
religious institution on a full-time or part-time basis increases from 35% for HighSES students to 45% 
for MidSES students. In addition, while fathers of only 11% (5%) of male (female) students attending 
HighSES spent more than 2 years studying in a Madrassa on either a part-time or full-time basis, the 
corresponding proportion for Madrassa students is 20%. This suggests that the various groups in our 
setting interact with and have exposure to each other at some level, but that the extent of exposure varies 
by institution.  
In short, the table shows that there is substantial sorting on observables into institutions. Students 
attending these three types of institutions clearly represent very different social and religious identities 
within the Pakistani society. At one end of the spectrum we have young males from poorer backgrounds 
who attend religious schools. At the other end of the spectrum we have wealthy students exposed to 
Western-type of education and high exposure to international media.  
 
2.3. Earnings expectations of female students 
We speculate that women’s social identity influences the discrimination they may suffer, in 
particular in the labor market. As a motivating fact for our experiments, we look at women and men’s 
expected earnings at age 30. These expectations were elicited as follows: “Consider the situation where 
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you graduate from [current institution]. Look ahead to when you will be 30 years old and suppose that 
you are working then. Think about the kinds of jobs that will be available to you. How much do you 
think you could earn per month on average at the age of 30 at these jobs?” 
We find that at HighSES, women and men expect very similar age 30 earnings on average (Rs. 
46,694 for females and Rs. 45,310 for males, with a p-value of 0.524 when testing equality of means), 
while at MidSES, females expect significantly lower earnings than men on average (Rs. 37,136 for 
females versus Rs. 44,079 for males, with a with a p-value of less than 0.001 when testing equality of 
means). Note that these expectations are conditional on working. Therefore, these patterns suggest that 
females graduating from MidSES are, on average, more likely to expect less favorable outcomes in  the 
labor market (relative to their male counterparts) than females graduating from HighSES. This is 
consistent with these MidSES females expecting to be discriminated in the labor market, and if these 
expectations are predictive of actual future realizations (as has been shown in the literature, for example, 
by Dominitz, 1998), then this also means that they will actually be discriminated in the labor market. We 
will assess whether the experimental results are consistent with this.                          
 
3. Theoretical Framework 
In this section, we present a simple stylized model of behavior in the trust and dictator games 
with identity (which we call social background below and refers to the institution a student belongs to) 
to illustrate the mechanisms that can lead to observed choices in these games.  Incorporating identity 
directly into the utility function was introduced into economic analysis by Akerlof and Kranton (2000). 
Consider a player with social background s and gender g. His utility usg(.,.) is assumed to depend 
on his own payoff and that of his partner of characteristics (s’,g’). Several papers have modeled the 
motivation for other-regarding behavior, i.e. deriving utility from others’ payoff. It could take the form 
of altruism (Andreoni and Miller, 2002), warm glow (Andreoni, 1990), inequity-aversion (Fehr and 
Schmidt, 1999; Bolton and Ockenfels, 2000) or maximin preferences (Charness and Rabin, 2002).
 
We 
are agnostic here about these underlying motivations. 
For simplicity, we assume that the player’s utility is linear in both his payoff and in a strictly 
concave function βs,g,s’,g’(.) of his partner’s payoff (𝛽′𝑠,𝑔,𝑠’,𝑔’(. ) > 0 and 𝛽′′𝑠,𝑔,𝑠’,𝑔’(. ) < 0), that equals 
zero if the partner has zero payoff (βs,g,s’,g’(0)=0). The function βs,g,s’,g’ (.) depends on the characteristics 
of both players and captures how much a player with characteristics (s,g) values the payoff of a partner 
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with characteristics (s’,g’).  We further assume that the utility is separable in both own and partner’s 
payoffs, to keep the illustration simple. The hypotheses that we test are similar if they are relaxed. So if 
a and b are the payoffs of the player and his partner respectively, the utility the player gets is given by: 
𝑢𝑠𝑔(𝑎, 𝑏) = 𝑎 + 𝛽𝑠,𝑔,𝑠’,𝑔’(𝑏). 
With this set-up, we present the decision rule for each game. 
 
3.1. Trust game 
In the trust game, the player must decide whether to invest the amount P in his partner, in which 
case the partner may return some amount r ∈ [0,3P] back to him, or keep everything. We assume that 
the player formulates subjective expectations about how much the partner will send back, and that this 
expectation Es,g,s’,g’(.) depends on the gender and social background of both the player and the partner.  
The player’s expected utility is thus given by: 
Max{P, 𝐸𝑠,𝑔,𝑠’,𝑔’[𝑟 + 𝛽𝑠,𝑔,𝑠’,𝑔’( 3P − 𝑟)]} 
= Max {P, 𝐸𝑠,𝑔,𝑠’,𝑔’(𝑟) + 𝛽𝑠,𝑔,𝑠’,𝑔’ ( 3P − 𝐸𝑠,𝑔,𝑠’,𝑔’(𝑟))}. 
The player will choose to invest in the trust game (𝑖𝑠,𝑔,𝑠’,𝑔’ = 1) if: 
P < 𝐸𝑠,𝑔,𝑠’,𝑔’(𝑟) + 𝛽𝑠,𝑔,𝑠’,𝑔’ ( 3P − 𝐸𝑠,𝑔,𝑠’,𝑔’(𝑟)). 
Note that the utility function of the player depends on both the player’s expectations about how 
much the partner will send back as well as the function 𝛽(.). Consider two players with characteristics 
(s,g), both matched with a partner of background 𝑠’, but of different genders. We may observe the same 
decision rule, but the students could still have different expectations 𝐸𝑠,𝑔,𝑠’,𝑚(𝑟) and 𝐸𝑠,𝑔,𝑠’,𝑓(𝑟) and 
different functions 𝛽𝑠,𝑔,𝑠’,𝑚(. ) and 𝛽𝑠,𝑔,𝑠’,𝑓(. ). In other words, observing no gender discrimination in the 
trust game does not rule out that expectations and tastes 𝛽𝑠,𝑔,𝑠’,𝑔′(. ) do not differ by gender. Similarly, if 
we do observe different investment decisions in the trust game, we cannot conclude whether the nature 
of the discrimination is taste-based (i.e., different 𝛽s) and/or whether it is statistical, i.e., different 
expectations about returns. However, using other games can allow us to tease this out. We discuss them 
below. 
 
3.2. Dictator game 
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In the dictator game, the player must decide how to allocate an amount A between himself and 
his partner. His decision problem of how much to allocate to the partner (that is, 𝑑) is therefore: 
Max𝑑{A − 𝑑 + 𝛽𝑠,𝑔,𝑠’,𝑔’(𝑑)} s.t. 𝑑 ∈ [0, A]. 
We have a corner solution where the player allocates zero to the other player if the function 
𝛽𝑠,𝑔,𝑠’,𝑔’(𝑑) < 1 ∀ 𝑑 ∈ [0, A], and A if the function is greater than 1 over the range of 𝑑. Otherwise, the 
first-order-condition gives the optimal amount 𝑑𝑠,𝑔,𝑠’,𝑔’as follows: 
𝛽′
𝑠,𝑔,𝑠’,𝑔’
(𝑑𝑠,𝑔,𝑠’,𝑔’) = 1. 
Consider two players with characteristics (s,g), both matched with a partner of background 𝑠’, but of 
different genders. Observing different allocations to the partners of different genders means that there is 
gender discrimination. Moreover, this discrimination is taste-based. 
 
3.3. Expectations 
Respondents are asked to guess the average amount that students from the partner’s institution 
chose to send back to their matched partner from the respondent’s institution in the trust game. They 
should report: 𝐸𝑠,𝑔,𝑠’,𝑔’(𝑟). Consider two players with characteristics (s,g), both matched with a partner 
of background 𝑠’ , but of different genders. Different reports of expectations by gender would mean that 
there is gender discrimination; moreover, this discrimination is statistical. 
 
4. Experimental Design 
 We now discuss the experimental design. 
Procedure: The experiments were conducted at the students’ institutions in sessions of 50-100 students 
in a classroom large enough to ensure respondent anonymity. The instructions were given to each 
participant, read aloud by the experimenters and projected on a computer projector. Respondents played 
the games on a paper questionnaire and were matched with an actual partner ex-post, so they did not 
learn the identity or action of their partner while playing the game. The questionnaire was administered 
in Urdu at all places except one of LUs where it was conducted in English, since students there are more 
used to reading and writing in English.
7
 Moreover, the questionnaires were identical across all the 
institutions up to the section leading into the experiments. 
 
                                                          
7
 The translation was supervised by Zafar who speaks English and Urdu fluently to ensure that nothing was lost in translation.  
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Games: Students were asked to play the following games: 
- Trust game: Player A (the sender) is given a fixed amount of money (Rs. 300) and decides 
whether to keep it or invest it by giving it to Player B (the receiver). If given to Player B, the 
experimenter triples that amount and gives it to Player B who is asked to choose whether to 
transfer any money back to Player A (which can be any amount between zero and Rs. 900). The 
efficient outcome is for Player A to invest the money by transferring it to Player B, while the 
subgame perfect equilibrium is to keep the money. Lack of trust towards the partner may lead to 
inefficiencies. This is a binary version of the “trust game” introduced by Berg et al.(1995)—it is 
binary in the sense that Player A can choose to send either nothing or the entire amount. In our 
setting, all respondents played the role of Player A and the role of a Player B (but as we explain 
below, students were compensated at most for one of these roles chosen at random). When put in 
the role of Player B, we use the strategy method and ask the respondent to report the amount 
he/she would like to send back conditional on Player A deciding to invest.  
- Dictator game: This is a one-stage game in which Player A (the sender) decides on the division 
of a fixed amount of money (Rs 400) between himself/herself and Player B (the receiver). Player 
B does not make any choice. Again, respondents play the role of both Player A as well as Player 
B.
8
 
- Expectations:  Respondents were asked to guess the average amount that students from their 
partner’s institution (that is, institution of the student in the role of Player B) chose to send back 
to their matched partners – Player A (who were all students at the respondent’s own institution) – 
in the trust game. Note that when students are asked to provide their expectations, they are asked 
about the average payoffs for a pair of partners that is identical in terms of gender and institution 
of the match. Also expectations were elicited after the respondent had made the decision in the 
games and were incentivized.
9
 
                                                          
8
 We chose a binary trust game and a continuous dictator game in order to make the differences in the decisions salient to the 
respondents. Since our sample pool is quite different from standard experimental settings and we were concerned about the 
literacy of the respondents and their ability to understand the decisions, we kept the games as simple and as distinct as 
possible from each other.  
9
 While we want to measure the respondent’s expectation of the amount his partner sends back in the trust game, we ask the 
respondent to guess the average amount sent back by all students of the same gender as the match from the partner's 
institution (who are matched with students in the respondent's institution). This is because, asking the respondent for his 
expectation of the amount sent back by his partner, may prompt the respondent to report expectations that rationalize his own 
investment decision in the trust game. We believe our approach mitigates this concern of ex-post rationalization, and is hence 
superior. The exact question wording was as follows: “If you, the sender, sent Rs. 300 in this game, the responder would 
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Treatment: The treatment in this experiment is the randomization of institution and gender of the 
matched player. Each student was randomly matched with one of the five following partners: a male 
student from a Liberal University, a female student from a Liberal University, a male student from an 
Islamic university, a female student from an Islamic university, or a male Madrassa student. The 
description of the match (with the exact name of the match’s educational institution and the partner’s 
gender) was already printed on the paper questionnaire received by each participant, so students were 
not aware that other participants in their session could possibly be matched with partners of different 
gender and educational institutions.
10
 Each student was informed that they would play all the games with 
the same partner. Students were given a short description of the institution they were matched with but 
since the selected institutions are among the most well-known institutions, most students would have 
some prior knowledge of them. We therefore have a between-subject design. Each student was matched 
with only one partner of a given gender and institution, and could not have known if other students were 
matched with someone from a different institution/gender (and what other potential institutions may 
have been involved). In terms of implementation, the pairing was carried out after the experiment, with 
replacement, and the match was one-way. This means that multiple students could possibly have been 
matched with the same partner, and the partner with whom the student was matched may or may not 
have been matched with the same student. Table 2 presents the sample sizes for each institution, and for 
the various matches.
11
 Because we use a one-way match, the sum in a given row does not need to match 
the sum in the corresponding column. 
 
Payoffs: Respondents received financial compensation for their participation in the survey and the 
games. Each received a show-up fee of Rs. 200 given on the day of the session. Some tasks were then 
randomly chosen for determining the additional payoffs. One of the four roles (sender or receiver in the 
                                                                                                                                                                                                         
receive Rs. 900 and had to decide how much to return to the sender and how much to keep for themself. Now we ask you to 
guess the average amount (out of Rs. 900) that students of gender (where gender = {male, female}) from “institution X” 
chose to return to students from your institution. Your reward will depend on your accuracy. You would receive Rs. 50 for 
choosing the correct interval, and zero otherwise. The interval that contains the average amount is: …”. 
10
 As mentioned in Section 2.1, we had two participating liberal universities. Students belonging to those and matched with 
someone from a liberal university were matched with someone of their own university.
  
11
 Students at Madrassas who were assigned a “Male Madrassa treatment” were matched either with a student at their own 
Madrassa or a different Madrassa (but one that belonged to the same school of thought). Because we do not find any 
systematic differences between the two in our analysis, the two groups are combined. Since it combines two treatments, more 
Madrassa students are matched with Madrassa students than with HighSES and MidSES students in Table 2. 
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trust game, sender or receiver in the dictator game) was randomly selected for compensation, along with 
one of the four expectations questions (Rs. 50 if the respondent correctly identified the interval where 
the actual average lies). Before making their decisions, students were informed that they would receive 
compensation for one of the four roles, chosen at random. Once the sessions were completed, we 
randomly matched students with a particular partner from the institution/gender indicated in their 
questionnaire (and who also had to be matched with a partner of those characteristics) and determined 
the payoffs. Subjects could pick up their compensation starting about one week after the completion of 
the experiment. Respondents earned an average of Rs. 600 from the games. The overall average 
compensation of Rs. 800 corresponds to about USD 10. This is the equivalent of about 3 meals out at 
inexpensive restaurants, or a monthly pass of local transport. The 2009 per capita GNI at purchasing 
power parity in Pakistan was $2,710, compared to $46,730 in the US. This means the average 
compensation of USD 10 corresponds to 0.4% of the GNI per capita. The US equivalent would be 
approximately USD 170. Therefore, the stakes involved in the experiments were large. 
 
5. Experimental results 
Our main goals are to (i) identify whether there is gender discrimination in the trust game, i.e., 
whether players’ behavior differs by the gender of the partner, (ii) analyze the nature (statistical versus 
taste-based) of this potential discrimination, and (iii) investigate whether potentially discriminatory 
behavior varies according to the institutions of both the primary player and of the institution of his/her 
partner. The theoretical model in Section 3 highlights the challenge we face in the identification of 
discrimination. We therefore start by establishing whether there is any discrimination in the trust game, 
and then move on to analyze the behavior in the dictator game and the expectations data.  
Because participants may treat partners from different institutions differently for reasons 
unrelated to gender, our test for gender discrimination will always be done by comparing how males and 
females from the same institution are treated. This comparison relies on the assumption that our 
respondents have the same beliefs about the distribution of observable characteristics of males and 
females at a given institution. Instead, for example, if individuals believed that MidSES females were 
from higher-income households (compared to MidSES males) and other-regarding preferences were 
declining in partner’s SES background, then the propensity to send less to MidSES females (than 
corresponding males) would be statistical discrimination. As shown in Section 2.2, at both MidSES and 
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HighSES, females tend to come from slightly more advantaged backgrounds than their male 
counterparts. We believe it is quite unlikely that students are aware of these small differences (the 
gender difference in characteristics within the institutions was a surprise to us and our survey team), but 
we cannot rule this out entirely. Our focus is on gender discrimination by males, so in what follows, 
players are always males, while partners can be males or females. 
5.1. Gender discrimination 
We begin by testing the following hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 1: There is no gender discrimination in the trust game, conditional on partners’ institutions. 
 
Table 3 presents the overall proportion of senders who chose to send the Rs. 300 in the trust 
game, conditional on the institution and gender of both the sender and the responder. In order to test for 
gender discrimination, we investigate whether investment behavior in the trust game varies by gender of 
the partner, keeping institution of the partner and gender and institution of the primary player fixed. For 
respondents belonging to a row institution, testing this hypothesis means testing for differences in the 
investment behavior when matched with HighSES males versus HighSES females, and for testing for 
differences when matched with MidSES males versus MidSES females. As a robustness check, we also 
test for differences when aggregating HighSES and MidSES males versus HighSES and MidSES 
females. 
Table 3 provides two important results. First, HighSES males do not discriminate in their 
behavior according to the gender of the matched partner, even after taking into consideration the 
institution of the match. This is demonstrated by the fact that none of the two sets of pairwise hypothesis 
tests that we conduct (Wilcoxon rank-sum and t-test) between having a match with a male versus female 
of a given institution type is statistically significant at conventional levels of significance for HighSES 
males. Second, holding the institution of the matched partner fixed, we notice statistically significant 
differences by gender in the behavior of MidSES and Madrassa students, which reveals important 
interaction between gender and institutions. MidSES male students treat MidSES males and MidSES 
females similarly, but treat HighSES females more favorably that they treat HighSES males: 55% of the 
MidSES males sent money when matched with an HighSES male compared to 68% when matched to an 
HighSES female (the difference is statistically different from zero at 10%). We also find that Madrassa 
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students treat HighSES males and HighSES females similarly, but treat MidSES females less favorably 
than MidSES males: 80% of the Madrassas students sent money when matched with an MidSES male 
compared to only 68% when matched to an MidSES female (the difference is statistically significant at 
1%).  
The first two columns of  Appendix Table A1 analyze behavior in the trust game using a linear 
regression framework. The dependent variable is a dummy for whether a participant sent money in the 
trust game. In the first column, the independent variables include dummies for every potential pair of 
partners. For example, the first dummy variable, HighSESplayer ×MidSESpartner, equals 1 for a pair 
where the player is a HighSES male and the partner is from MidSES. Similarly, the second dummy, 
HighSESplayer × (MidSESpartner × Female), equals 1 for a pair where the player is a HighSES male 
and the partner is from MidSES and is female. The average behavior of a HighSES male student 
matched with a male MidSES student is captured by the first variable, while the average behavior of a 
HighSES male student matched with a female MidSES student is reflected by the sum of these two 
variables. By comparing these two coefficients, we can test for whether MidSES females are treated 
differently than MidSES males by HighSES males. We do find similar results as in Table 3: Madrassa 
males are found to treat MidSES females less favorably than they treat MidSES males; the coefficient 
Madrassaplayer × (MidSESpartner × female) indicates that they are 13.4 percentage points less likely 
to send money to MidSES females in the trust game (relative to when matched with MidSES males) and 
the coefficient is statistically significant at 5%. We also see that MidSES males treat HighSES females 
more favorably than HighSES males (coefficient statistically significant at 1%), while they treat 
MidSES males and females similarly. Notably, in column 2 when we add demographic characteristics as 
controls, we see that the coefficient of the dummies for the pairs are essentially unchanged.  
 
5.2. Nature of Discrimination 
These results highlight differences in how males invest (i.e., whether they send money to the 
matched partner) in the trust game depending on the gender of their partners, holding institutions fixed. 
As highlighted in the theoretical framework, there are several dimensions of preferences and beliefs that 
may motivate a subject to invest in the trust game. One motivation could be unconditional other-
regarding preferences. Another one could be beliefs about trustworthiness of the partner (Dufwenberg 
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and Gneezy 2000; Cox 2004; Ashraf et al. 2006). Finally, risk preferences may play a role in the 
decision (Karlan 2005; Schecter 2007).
 12
  
Empirically, determining which one has the largest weight in influencing behavior is important 
to understand the nature of players’ discriminatory behavior. This is of interest to academics, but of 
particular relevance to policy-makers since effective policies and legislation to deal with gender 
discrimination can be crafted only if the nature of discrimination is understood. For example, while 
HighSES males exhibit similar investment behavior in the trust game towards males and females 
conditional on match institution, as we explain in Section 3, their action could still be consistent with 
different levels of trust and of unconditional other-regarding behavior towards males and females.. 
Results from the trust game alone do not allow the identification of the relative roles of those 
dimensions (Cox 2004).  Our multiple-game experimental design, however, allows us to separately 
measure unconditional other-regarding behavior and expected trustworthiness, and therefore to inform 
us about the nature of discrimination, under the assumption that the only difference between men and 
women within an institution is gender. In the dictator game, the only motive for sending money to the 
partner is preferences (unconditional other-regarding behavior). We can thus learn more about taste-
based discrimination by analyzing how students play that game. In addition, the elicitation of expected 
average amount sent back by each match group to students from their own institution gives us a measure 
of expected trustworthiness towards each group, and therefore gives us an indication of statistical 
discrimination.  
We test the following hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 2: Conditional on the partner’s institution, expectations of the partner’s trustworthiness do 
not differ by the partner’s gender. 
 
We collected data on respondents’ expectations regarding the average amount expected from the 
matched group. Note that respondents choose an interval for the average expected amount and do not 
report a point estimate for the exact average. The mean and median amounts presented in Table 4 are 
those obtained by allocating as average expected amount the middle of the chosen interval. To show the 
                                                          
12
 Students were randomly assigned a treatment (i.e., match type). Therefore, differences in risk preferences cannot explain 
any of the results (across match types). We have qualitative measures of risk preferences from the respondents, and they are 
in fact similar within each treatment conditional on the student’s institution. 
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distribution of expectations, we also present the proportion of respondents who expect to receive more 
than Rs. 200 and more than Rs. 300. Those are obtained directly from respondents’ answers without any 
assumption. Again, we focus on the differences in expectations by gender keeping the institution of the 
match fixed.  
Three points from this table are of note. First, HighSES students believe males and females 
within an institution to be equally trustworthy: none of the three sets of pairwise hypothesis tests that we 
conduct— t-test, Wilcoxon rank-sum, and Kolmogorov-Smirnov—between having a match with a male 
versus female of a given institution type (HighSES male versus HighSES female; MidSES male versus 
MidSES female) are statistically significant at conventional levels of significance for HighSES males.
13
 
Second, we again note some differences by gender of the matched partner for MidSES students. 
MidSES males believe MidSES females to be less trustworthy than MidSES males (difference in the 
mean is statistically significant from zero at 10%), while they expect HighSES females to be more 
trustworthy than HighSES males (the proportion expected to send back more than Rs. 200 is statistically 
significant at 10%). Recall that they were more likely to send money to HighSES females in the trust 
game, so positive statistical discrimination may explain this. Note, however, that there was no difference 
in their investment behavior by gender for partners from MidSES. Third, Madrassa students expect 
females to be more trustworthy than males. In particular, Madrassa students expect females to return 
about Rs. 25 more on average than their male counterparts (this difference is statistically significant at 
5% when aggregating HighSES and MidSES), and assign a 8 percentage-point higher probability to 
females sending back more than Rs. 300 than males (this difference is statistically significant at 10% for 
both MidSES and HighSES). Similar qualitative results are shown in a regression framework with and 
without demographic controls in columns (3) and (4) of Table A1. Recall that Madrassa students were 
less likely to send money to MidSES females in the trust game. The results presented in Table 4 suggest 
that statistical discrimination cannot explain their differential behavior by gender in the trust game. In 
fact, keeping unconditional other-regarding behavior constant, given that Madrassa students expect 
                                                          
13
 The p-values for these tests are not reported in the table. Instead, they are denoted by asterisks on the mean, median, and 
sample size, respectively, in the relevant female column. The t-test is a parametric test for the equality of the means (under 
the assumption that the variable is normally distributed); the Wilcoxon rank-sum test is a non-parametric analog to the t-test, 
and is a rank sum test: The Wilcoxon test ranks all of the observations from both groups and then sums the ranks from one of 
the groups which is compared with the expected rank sum. It is possible for groups to have different rank sums (and hence 
the test of equality being rejected) and yet have equal or nearly equal medians. Finally, the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test is a 
non-parametric test for the equality of continuous distributions. 
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females to be more trustworthy than males, they should be investing more in the trust game when 
matched with females than with males.  
Overall, this would suggest that the gender discrimination observed in the trust game by 
Madrassa students is unlikely to be statistical and most likely taste-based. Behavior in the dictator 
game—where the main motivation for sending money to the matched partner is unconditional other-
regarding behavior—allows us to investigate this further. We next test the following hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 3: Conditional on the partner’s institution, the amount sent in the dictator game does not 
differ by the partner’s gender. 
 
Table 5 shows the average amounts sent in the dictator game for all pairs of partners. Madrassa 
students send lower amounts on average to females than males. The differences appear not to be 
statistically significant when we consider each institution separately, but if we compare females from 
MidSES and HighSES against males from MidSES and HighSES (last two columns), we find a 
statistically significant difference in average amount sent using a t-test (P-value=0.051) and using the 
Wilcoxon rank-sum test (P-value=0.032). This suggests that Madrassas student exhibit taste-based 
discrimination against females.  
Regarding HighSES males and MidSES males, the three sets of pairwise hypothesis tests 
between having a match with a male versus female of a given institution type (HighSES male versus 
HighSES female; MidSES male versus MidSES female) that we conduct are not statistically significant, 
suggesting that there is no significant taste-based discrimination by those groups of students. However, a 
much higher proportion of MidSES males send nothing in the dictator game to MidSES females 
compared to MidSES males (26.7% versus 16.3%) and the difference is statistically significant at 10%. 
This is consistent with some form of taste-based discrimination against MidSES females. The last two 
columns of Table A1 investigate this within a regression framework and show similar qualitative 
(though less precisely estimated) results. 
 
We now summarize all our results presented so far by institutions: 
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RESULT 1: HighSES male students do not discriminate by gender in the trust game and in the dictator 
game, and believe males and female within an institution to be equally trustworthy. This is consistent 
with no (statistical or taste-based) gender discrimination. 
 
RESULT 2: MidSES male students favor HighSES females in the trust game but treat MidSES males and 
MidSES females similarly. They believe MidSES females to be less trustworthy than MidSES males but 
they believe HighSES females to be more trustworthy than HighSES males. They do not discriminate by 
gender in the dictator game (though they are more likely to not send anything to MidSES females). This 
is consistent with statistical discrimination in favor of HighSES females, and (primarily statistical) 
discrimination against MidSES females compared to their male counterparts.  
 
RESULT 3: Male Madrassa students discriminate against MidSES females (but not HighSES females) 
in their investment behavior in the trust game. This is despite the fact that they believe females to be 
more trustworthy than males. They discriminate by gender in the dictator, which is consistent with 
exhibiting taste-based discrimination against both MidSES and HighSES females.  
 
The focus in this paper is on male behavior. We also have a small sample of women from MidSES and 
HighSES. We present some descriptive statistics in Table A2 on their behaviour and expectations for 
completeness. As we find for males, HighSES females do not discriminate by gender in the trust game 
and in the dictator game, and believe males and female within an institution to be equally trustworthy. 
However, MidSES females discriminate against HighSES females (but not MidSES females) in the trust 
game. They also have lower expectations of the trustworthiness of HighSES females relative to 
HighSES males. In addition, they send a significantly lower amount to HighSES females relative to 
HighSES males in the dictator game, and a larger amount to females than to males at MidSES.  This is 
consistent with taste-based discrimination in favor of MidSES females, and both taste-based and 
statistical discrimination against HighSES females.  
 
5.3. Relative versus absolute position 
Thus far, the focus of our study led us to analyze behavior and perceptions towards males and 
females within an institution (or social identity). From the women’s perspective, such discrimination is 
relevant for their well-being if they care about their relative position compared to men of similar social 
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identity. Recent empirical work has documented a systematic correlation between measures of relative 
income and happiness/subjective well-being (e.g., Luttmer 2005; Clark et al. 2008) and reported job 
satisfaction and turnover (e.g., Clark and Oswald 1996; Card et al. 2012). Absolute position may also be 
relevant to women and it is therefore interesting to evaluate which groups of males treat females better 
in absolute terms. The last few rows in Tables 3 and 5 report the p-values of the F-test and Kruskal-
Wallis test testing for equality of means and distribution for each column of matched partner (i.e., 
conditional on a  match group, testing for equality of means and distribution across institutions). It 
enables us to investigate whether there are systematic differences by groups in their investment behavior 
for Table 3 or other-regarding behavior for Table 5 towards MidSES and HighSES females. Table 3 
shows that there are statistically significant differences (as indicated by the low p-values of the two tests 
in the last two rows), and that a higher proportion of Madrassa students invest with female partners at 
both MidSES and HighSES compared to HighSES and MidSES males. A similar pattern is observed in 
the dictator game: Madrassa students give more to female students in the dictator game than any other 
groups of males. This is because Madrassas students tend to invest more in the trust game and give more 
in the dictator game than the other groups of males. Thus, even though they treat females worse than 
males, they still treat females better than the other groups of males.   
More generally, column (1), in both Tables 3 and 5, shows that students in the various 
institutions differ significantly in their investment behavior and dictator game split, respectively. 
Conditional on matches with male students (columns 2, 4, 6, and 7 of the tables), we see that Madrassa 
students exhibit significantly higher trust and stronger unconditional other-regarding behavior. We do 
not explore this point in this paper since here the focus is on gender discrimination. This issue is 
discussed in detail in Delavande and Zafar (2015). 
It should also be pointed out that, compared to existing studies, we find very high levels of trust 
and other-regarding behavior in our sample. In Delavande and Zafar (2015), we present detailed 
evidence that these high levels of pro-social behavior are not a consequence of other confounds, such as 
students not understanding the games, or not finding the incentives credible. 
 
5.4. Accuracy of expectations 
If respondents act on their expectations and play according to social preferences equilibrium, it is 
these expectations that matter in explaining their choices, regardless of whether they are correct or not. 
However, if expectations are incorrect for a particular group, it implies incorrect stereotypes for that 
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group, which could result in inefficiencies in actual interactions in the society. Inaccurate expectations 
also imply there may be a case for policy interventions which disseminate accurate information. We 
therefore next investigate how the expectations of the partner’s trustworthiness match with actual 
trustworthiness (amount sent back in the trust game from the trustee), and whether there are any 
systematic gender biases. 
Table 6 compares the males’ expected amount received from the match with the average amount 
actually sent back by males and females. We show the proportion of (male) students who expected more 
than Rs 300 from a given group and the proportion of students from that group who actually sent more 
than Rs 300. The third row in each panel reports the p-value for the equality of these two proportions. In 
addition, we also show the proportion of students who had “accurate” expectations, i.e., those who chose 
the interval that contained the actual average.  
Table 6 shows that HighSES males have more accurate expectations about females than about 
males: they expect both males and females to give more than Rs. 300 on equal footing, but males 
actually tend to give less. MidSES males tend to underestimate the trustworthiness of HighSES males, 
but there are no systematic patterns by gender of the match. In contrast, Madrassa students have 
inaccurate expectations by gender. While their expectations about receiving more than Rs. 300 when 
matched with males are fairly similar to actual receipts, they over-estimate this probability for females 
by at least 15 percentage points. This overestimation is driven by both Madrassa students expecting 
females to be more trustworthy than their male counterparts (Table 4) and females actually sending back 
less than their male counterparts. Finally, it is interesting to note that all groups, except MidSES males 
and Madrassa students, underestimate the trustworthiness of Madrassa students; this is something that 
we explore in more detail in Delavande and Zafar (2015). 
 
 
6. Discussion of Confounding Factors and Potential Mechanisms  
 We find that Madrassa students are the only group of males who discriminate against females 
(from MidSES) in the trust game. A relevant question for policy is the extent to which this result is a 
consequence of selection into institutions versus teaching at the institutions. It is hard to speculate about 
the role of Madrassa teachings and environment in explaining our results. The relationship between 
Islam and treatment of women remains contentious (see discussion in Adida et al., 2014). Despite 
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widespread gender imbalances observed in Muslim societies, Islamic teachings state that men and 
women are both equal, and Islam accords rights of inheritance and ownership to women (Badawi, 1995; 
Lewis, 2003).
14
 However, many of the Islamic ancient texts and imperatives are open to interpretation, 
and there is considerable variation in how they are implemented. We also know little about how 
Madrassas teach their students to interpret these texts and rulings. We present some suggestive evidence 
that may shed light on whether the behavior of Madrassa students towards females is driven by selection 
or religious teaching, or both.
 
 
We conduct the following thought experiment within the pool of Madrassa students. In another 
part of the survey, respondents were asked which type of institutions they would attend if they were 
admitted to all institution types and all expenses would be covered. Twelve percent of the Madrassa 
students stated that they would choose to attend a non-Madrassa institution under those conditions (i.e., 
would “switch”). We can think of these students as not selecting into Madrassas on the basis of 
(observable and unobservable) characteristics since they would have attended another institution without 
budget or qualification requirements constraints. That is, the difference in behavior between these 
students and those who would attend a Madrassa regardless could arguably identify the extent to which 
selection into Madrassas drives our results. We find that this group of students invests at a significantly 
higher rate with female matches than students who would have chosen a Madrassa anyway: conditional 
on having a female match, the proportion of Madrassa students who invest in the trust game is 
respectively 93.6% and 72.9% (p-value of 0.002 for a pairwise t-test). This suggests that selection into 
Madrassas plays a role in the gender-discriminating behavior of Madrassa students.  
We also look at how the behavior of Madrassa students varies by how many years they have 
spent in a Madrassa environment.
15
 While the decision of how many years to spend in a Madrassa is not 
fully exogenous, we describe the differences in behavior for illustration purposes.
16
 Conditional on 
being matched with female students, the investment rate of Madrassa students who have spent more than 
                                                          
14
 In fact, medieval Islamic societies were far more progressive with regards to female rights than their European counterparts 
(Shatzmiller 1997; Lewis 2003). 
15
 The Madrassa students in our sample are those pursuing an “Alim” degree, which is equivalent to a Bachelor’s degree. 
However, students enrolling in this degree come from different academic backgrounds. Some of them may have studied in a 
Madrassa throughout, and others may have joined at different points in time. In our sample, students have spent 7.6 years on 
average in any Madrassa. However, there is substantial heterogeneity in our sample: 10 percent of the students have spent 
less than 4 years in a Madrassa, and 10 percent have spent more than 12 years in a Madrassa. 
16
 If we assume that the selection into Madrassas is negative (i.e., students likely to enroll and spend longer in Madrassas are 
less likely to trust females to begin with)—of which we find some evidence above—then any difference that we find by years 
spent in a Madrassa would be biased upwards. 
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8 years in a Madrassa (about a third of our sample) was 73.9%, compared to 78.3% for those who had 
spent 8 or fewer years in a Madrassa (with the difference not statistically different; p-value = 0.351). 
Therefore, more time spent in a Madrassa environment does not seem to be correlated with less trust of 
females. These pieces of evidence are suggestive at best, but seem to indicate that selection into a 
Madrassa, rather than exposure to the religious teachings of Madrassas, is an important factor in 
explaining the different behavior towards women (relative to comparable men) that we observe of 
Madrassa students.  
The fact that MidSES males, who are closer to the Madrassa students in terms of religiosity and 
wealth but are exposed to very different teachings, exhibit some form of discrimination against MidSES 
females (though not in the trust game) is also consistent with background characteristics being 
important. We further investigate the role of socio-economic status and religiosity in Table 7. Table 1 
shows that, within each institution type, there is heterogeneity in terms of income and religiosity. For 
example, the proportion of male students from a high income family (parents earning more than Rs 
32,500 per month) is 69% at HighSES, 32% at MidSES, and 8% at the Madrassas. Similarly, the 
proportion of students with high religiosity (reporting 9 or 10 on the 0-10 scale) is 6% at HighSES, 8% 
at MidSES, and 77% at the Madrassas. The dependent variables in Table 7 are the behavior in the games 
(dummy for investing in the trust game, amount sent in the dictator game, and amount expected back in 
the trust game, respectively). We conduct separate regressions by partner’s institutions and evaluate how 
being matched with a female partner interacted by measures of socio-economic status and religiosity 
influence behavior in the games, while controlling for other characteristics, and, importantly, the main 
player’s institution. The second column in Table 7 shows that, among players matched with a partner 
from HighSES, those from a high income household are, on average, 20.8 percentage points more likely 
to invest in the trust game with females, than those from a low income family (the estimate is 
statistically significant at 5%). In column 3, we see that, among players matched with a partner from 
MidSES, those from a low income family on average give less in the dictator game to females, 
compared to those from middle or high income families: males from middle (high) income families send 
Rs. 30 (Rs. 21) more to female partners from MidSES (however, only the estimate for female partner 
interacted with middle income is statistically significant). In Table 7, we see that none of the interaction 
terms between female partner and religiosity are statistically different from zero. This is consistent with 
the idea that our results are driven by socio-economic status rather than religiosity: men from lower 
socio-economic status seem more prone to discriminate against women from poorer backgrounds. 
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It should be pointed out that the only institution where we find that males do not treat female 
partners differently – HighSES – has gender-mixed education. The limited interaction between genders 
in the gender-segregated MidSES and Madrassa environments may lead to prejudice and incorrect 
beliefs about females. In the Indian context, Rao (2013) for example finds that being mixed with poor 
students makes other students overall exhibit more pro-social behavior. However, in our context, we 
also find that Madrassa students severely overestimate the amount returned by female matches in the 
trust game (they expect on average 85% of women to send back more than Rs. 300 in the trust game, 
while 67% do so), so it is not clear whether increased interactions with females would mitigate the 
discrimination that we observe. 
Higher SES children are likely to grow in a very different family context that may shape their 
perception of gender difference. In a Western country context, Decker et al. (2015) show that SES is a 
powerful predictor of many facets of a child's personality, including time preferences, risk preferences, 
and altruism. They discuss potential pathways and document that many dimensions of a child's 
environment, such as parenting style, quantity and quality of parent-children interactions, the mother's 
IQ and economic preferences, and family structure, differ significantly by SES. We do not have data to 
support this but higher-SES Pakistani children may be brought up with a more equal notion of gender by 
their parents. In a similar vein, it is also worthwhile to point out that, in our sample, students from 
higher-income families tend to live in households where the difference between the mother’s and 
father’s education is significantly smaller; the (mother minus father) difference is -1.6 years of education 
in above-median income families compared to -3.6 years of education in below-median income families 
(differences statistically different at the <1% level). As a result, mothers in higher-SES families may 
have more bargaining power within the household, exposing children to a more balanced relationship 
between mothers and fathers. 
In addition to individual characteristics, external factors, such as competition in the labor and 
marriage market, may also be responsible for some of the patterns in the data. For example, because they 
hail from a less privileged background, MidSES students may feel that they need to behave differently 
when facing someone from a higher socioeconomic status in order to reach a position similar to that of 
individuals from that status. This may explain why, in the trust game, MidSES males favor females of 
higher social class (relative to men of higher social class) but not women who belong to the same social 
class as themselves. 
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In Section 2.2, we note that, at both MidSES and HighSES, females tend to come from slightly 
more advantaged backgrounds than their male counterparts. One may therefore wonder whether looking 
at gender discrimination while holding the institution fixed truly isolates gender discrimination. As we 
mentioned above, we believe it is quite unlikely that students are aware of these small differences. We 
also note that, despite the fact that in both institutions, females have higher socioeconomic status than 
men, the discrimination we highlight is asymmetric: HighSES females tend to be favored compared to 
corresponding males, while MidSES females tend to be disadvantaged compared to MidSES males. If 
students are aware of these differences and if higher socio-economic status mitigates discrimination, this 
suggests that the discrimination we find against MidSES females would have been worse if they were 
perceived to be of similar socioeconomic characteristics as their male counterparts.  
 
7. Conclusion 
This paper shows interesting interactions between social identity and gender discrimination in 
the Pakistani context: gender discrimination is not uniform across the educated Pakistani society and 
varies in nature and intensity as a function of the social identity of both individuals who interact. We fail 
to find evidence of Liberal University (HighSES) male students—who are wealthier, less religious and 
more exposed to Western ideas—discriminating against women. Madrassa students, who come from 
more humble backgrounds, are more religious and relatively unexposed to Western ideas, exhibit taste-
based discrimination against women. However, because they give and trust more than any other groups, 
they actually treat women almost as well or better (in absolute terms) than other groups of males in the 
society. Islamic University (MidSES) male students, who fare in the middle in terms of wealth and 
religiosity, have a less uniform behavior: their behavior towards males and females depends on the 
institutions (or social identity) of the person with whom they interact. Islamic University males favor 
Liberal University females while they do not favor Islamic University females compared to their male 
counterparts in the trust game, and exhibit mostly statistical discrimination against Islamic University 
females. 
Our results are based on economic decision-making experiments. One reason for using this 
approach is that experiments illustrate actual behavior rather than what respondents believe and report to 
be their own behaviour. Second, experiments allow us to investigate the nature of discrimination—
something that is extremely challenging using observational data. To what extent is the discrimination 
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that we document using these games generalizable to real-world interactions? We do not have a clear 
answer to this question, since we do not observe naturally-occurring interactions in real settings for the 
respondents in our sample. However, evidence from few studies that combine data from laboratory 
games that measure social capital and pro-social behaviour, and behaviour in  real settings indicate that 
laboratory measures tend to be good predictors of behaviour in real-world situations (Karlan 2005; Benz 
and Meier 2008; Baran et al. 2010). While it is unclear how gender discrimination in trust exactly 
translates into discrimination in different situations, almost all bilateral exchanges—in the labor market 
or other market interactions—do require trust. For our results to have relevance, it suffices that trust 
matters, and that some part of the discrimination in trust channels into different dimensions. Consistent 
with our experimental results, and its potential ramification in the labor market, we do find that, high-
socioeconomic status women (from the Liberal University) expect to earn as much as their male 
counterparts after completing their degree, while lower-socioeconomic status women (from the Islamic 
University) expect to earn 18% less on average than their male counterparts. 
Because socio-economic status is negatively correlated with religiosity and lack of exposure to 
Western idea in our data, we cannot categorically determine the mechanisms that explain the gender 
taste-based discrimination that we identify. Yet, we provide some suggestive evidence that 
socioeconomic status, rather than religiosity or exposure to religious teachings, seem to be driving 
students’ behavior toward women. Independently of the exact mechanisms, within elite groups, higher 
status women are favored and less discriminated against in Pakistan, which may explain why some are 
able to reach important leadership positions.  
Generally, it is believed that educating women may by itself lead to female empowerment and 
thus result in less gender discrimination. In our study, both groups of females are pursuing the same 
level of education (Bachelor’s degrees), and studying similar subjects. Yet, higher SES and less 
religious females are favoured in some instances while lower SES and more religious females are 
discriminated against, by certain male respondents. Since it is unclear why women would be 
discriminated against because they are more religious, we speculate that the difference in socio-
economic status is driving this difference in discrimination. Note however that the behavior of our male 
respondents matched with male partners does not differ by the institution of their match, i.e., social 
identity seems to be irrelevant in the male-male interactions.
17
 This suggests that, when men interact 
                                                          
17
 This can be seen by comparing the investment levels across male matches within an institution (that is, a given row) in 
Table 3, or behavior in the dictator game in Table 5. The tables in this paper do not report results for pairwise comparisons of 
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with women, the woman’s social class is such a powerful construct that it continues to remain salient. 
This is particularly striking, since we focus on interactions of highly-educated individuals in a country 
where less than 10% of adults have a Bachelor’s degree (Pakistan Labor Force Survey 2008/2009).  
Our findings present a conundrum to policy-makers. Women belonging to lower socioeconomic 
class generally have fewer chances of upward social mobility, and have greater constraints. That 
females—but only those belonging to the lower social class—are discriminated against by (certain) 
males, indicates that those females who are already at a disadvantage to start out with are further 
marginalized. This suggests that social identities (such as class, ethnicity, race, etc.) are a powerful 
construct, and simply educating women may not be enough to overcome the distortions that are 
introduced by these other dimensions. Our results then imply that policies aimed at empowering women 
need to take into account the interaction of gender with social class. For example, simply promoting 
education for girls or allocating quotas to women in political or other spheres may not be sufficient to 
change attitudes towards women, and such policies may need to incorporate other characteristics—such 
as socio-economic background—along with gender. 
The taste-based nature of the discriminatory behavior of Madrassa students is also a challenge 
for policy design. In developed countries such as the US, rules forbidding taste-based discrimination 
have been erected for decades, and have been fairly effective at ameliorating taste-based discrimination 
(Gneezy et al. 2012). However, in developing settings such as the one in this study, it is not clear how 
effective such legislation would be. In addition, it is generally easier to implement policies that attenuate 
statistical discrimination by removing information inefficiencies.
18
 On the other hand, successful 
policies for altering gender tastes are less clear—they require understanding the formation of 
preferences, which is a challenging task. 
                                                                                                                                                                                                         
male matches (all of which are statistically insignificant). Interested readers are instead referred to Delavande and Zafar 
(2015) which focuses on male-male matches only.   
18
 For example, Beaman et al. (2009) find that exposure to female leaders (through mandated quotas) erases statistical 
discrimination against them by male villagers in India, but does not alter tastes for them. 
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Table 1: Summary Characteristics
HighSES MidSES Madrassa City
Male Fem Male Fem Male Male Fem
# of Observations 758 203 444 286 1145 394 341
Age 21 21 22 22* 22 34 31**
(2.8 ) (3.4 ) (2.5 ) (2.2 ) (3 ) (13 ) (12 )
Fathers yrs of education 12 12 11 13*** 7.1 7.7 11***
(5.2 ) (5.4 ) (4.2 ) (3.2 ) (5 ) (5.4 ) (4.7 )
Mothers yrs of education 12 13 *** 7.1 9*** 3.4 4 7.5***
(4.4 ) (3.6 ) (5.1 ) (4.5 ) (4.4 ) (4.9 ) (5.3 )
Parent income (000s Rs) 127 155 * 42 66*** 20 25 30
(182 ) (212 ) (52 ) (121 ) (60 ) (24 ) (31 )
% Middle Income (Rs. 9k-32.5k) 27.0 17.7*** 53.0 42.6*** 33.8 55.2 45.0*
% High Income (>Rs 32.5k) 69.0 79.3*** 32.3 48.2*** 8.0 14.7 22.9**
# of siblings 3.5 3 *** 4.5 4.2* . 5.1 4.3***
(2 ) (1.7 ) (2.3 ) (2 ) (. ) (3 ) (2.5 )
% attend relig schoola 35 19*** 45 30*** 100 9 12
% father Madrassab 11 5** 12 8* 20 1 1
% Parents own:
home 88 87 82 79 82 100 100
tv 85 87 79 93*** 30 84 56***
cell phone 83 85 80 87** 74 97 84***
computer 74 78 59 74*** 25 70 51***
internet access 57 67** 39 52*** 7 45 35***
motorbike 59 48*** 50 42** 33 61 19***
car 72 81** 41 57*** 10 37 25***
Religiosity (0-10)c 5.7 5.6 6.3 6.3 9.2 6.1 6.3
(1.8 ) (1.6 ) (1.7 ) (1.6 ) (1.6 ) (2.4 ) (1.8 )
% Middle religiosity (6 to 8) 43.7 40.7 53.3 58.8 16.9 30.2 47.6***
% High religiosity (9-10) 5.8 4.2 8.3 5.6 77.5 19.0 12.7**
Number of times pray/day 2 2.4 *** 2.9 3.6*** 4.9 2.9 3.6 ***
(1.7 ) (1.7 ) (1.7 ) (1.3 ) (.42 ) (1.9 ) (1.5 )
Prop that fast Ramadhan .91 .87 ** .96 .94* .98 .89 .88
(.21 ) (.25 ) (.15 ) (.17 ) (.12 ) (.24 ) (.25 )
Trust (0-10)d 4.6 4 *** 4.6 3.9** 5.1 . .
(2.4 ) (2.4 ) (2.7 ) (2.8 ) (3.4 ) (. )
Risk general (0-10)e 6.8 7 6.6 6.1** 5.2 . .
(2.3 ) (2.1 ) (2.4 ) (2.5 ) (3.9 ) (. )
% watch:
English news 84 88 83 83 25 24 53***
BBC or CNN 59 70*** 60 59 23 12 25***
a Percent of respondents who have ever attended a religious institution (full time or part time)
b Percent of respondents whose father attended a Madrassa or any religious institution for
more than 2 years (either part time or full time).
c Self-reported religiosity on a scale of zero (not religious at all) to 10 (very religious).
d Response to question: "....most people can be trusted?" on a scale of zero (all people
cannot be trusted) to 10 (all people can be trusted).
e Self-reported risk preference on a scale of zero (totally unwilling to take risk) to 10
(fully prepared to take risks).
This table shows pairwise t-tests for male versus female characteristics within each institution.
Signicant at * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p <0.01. Asterisks shown in the female column.
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Table 2: Number of respondents by match
Matched with:
Institution: HighSES Male HighSES Female MidSES Male MidSES Female Madrassa Total
HighSES Male 153 145 141 158 161 758
HighSES Female 40 47 57 33 26 203
MidSES Male 89 87 86 87 95 444
MidSES Female 57 56 54 53 66 286
Madrassa 236 217 198 132 362 1,145
Total 575 552 536 463 710 2,836
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Table 4: Amount Expected back from match out of Rs.900
Matched with:
Institution: Total HighSES MidSES Madrassa HighSES + HighSES
Male Female Male Female Male Male Female
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
HighSES Male
mean 369.79 363.1 374.8 387.6 383.5 342.6 374.8 379.4
median 350.00 350.0 450.0 450.0 450.0 350.0 350.0 450.0
Prop. expect >200 0.897 0.895 0.917 0.901 0.905 0.870 0.898 0.911
Prop. expect >300 0.722 0.712 0.766 0.745 0.759 0.634 0.728 0.762
N 758 153 145 141 158 161 294 303
MidSES Male
mean 354.28 333.2 355.8 379.1 341.9 361.6 355.7 348.9
median 350.00 350.0 350.0 350.0 350.0 450.0 350.0 350.0
Prop. expect >200 0.869 0.787 0.885 0.930 0.828 0.916 0.857 0.856
Prop. expect >300 0.694 0.640 0.667 0.756 0.701 0.705 0.697 0.684
N 444 89 87 86 87 95 175 174
Madrassa Male
mean 412.22 404.1 425.4 405.9 429.4 406.8 404.9 426.9
median 450.00 450.0 450.0 450.0 450.0 450.0 450.0 450.0
Prop. expect >200 0.923 0.919 0.926 0.919 0.947 0.917 0.919 0.934
Prop. expect >300 0.799 0.750 0.839 0.783 0.856 0.796 0.765 0.845
N 1133 233 215 195 131 359 428 346
P-value for:
F-testa 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.297 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Median testb 0.000 0.003 0.000 0.075 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000
K-Wallis testc 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.110 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
a F-test for the equality of means across institutions.
b Nonparametric median test for the equality of medians across institutions.
c Kruskal-Wallis test for the equality of distributions across institutions.
In addition, this table reports the following pairwise tests between having a match with HighSES Male versus
HighSES Female, and between having a match with MidSES Male versus MidSES Female:
a) For the amount expected in the Trust game:(1) T-test on the means; (2) Wilcoxon rank-sum test on
the medians; (3) Kolmogrov-Smirnov test on the sample sizes.
b) For the proportion expecting >200 and >300, Wilcoxon rank-sum test is reported.
P-values for these tests not reported, but their signicance is denoted by asterisks in columns for
female matches. For all tests,* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
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Table 5: Amount Sent in Dictator game
Matched with
Institution: Total HighSES MidSES Madrassa HighSES + MidSES
Male Fem Male Fem Male Male Fem
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
HighSES Male
mean 163.13 151.30 145.67 180.63 171.35 166.68 165.37 159.06
median 200 200 200 200 200 200 200 200
N 758 153 145 141 158 161 294 303
% dont send 0.088 0.111 0.110 0.050 0.076 0.093 0.082 0.092
MidSES Male
mean 140.27 141.59 150.07 135.49 118.24 154.53 138.58 134.06
median 200 200 200 185 100 200 200 200
N 440 88 85 86 86 95 174 171
% dont send 0.161 0.159 0.128 0.163 0.267 0.095 0.161 0.198
Madrassa Male
mean 181.74 187.39 178.12 189.44 179.24 176.93 188.34 178.55
median 200 200 200 200 200 200 200 200

N 1139 233 217 198 132 359 431 349
% dont send 0.032 0.038 0.032 0.030 0.038 0.028 0.034 0.034
P-value for:
F-test 0.000 0.000 .0007 0.000 0.000 .0064 0.000 0.000
Median test .0006 .1574 .4776 .0037 .0131 .7535 .0024 .0311
KWallis test 0.000 0.000 .0042 0.000 0.000 .0025 0.000 0.000
This table also reports four pairwise tests between having a match with HighSES Male
versus HighSES Female, and between having a match with MidSES Male versus MidSES Female:
(1) T-test for equality of the means (reported on the mean),
(2) Wilcoxon rank-sum for equality of the medians (reported on the median),
(3) Kolmogorov-Smirnov for equality of the distribution (reported on the sample size), and
(4) T-test for equality of proportions who dont send (reported on the % dont send).
P-values for these tests not reported, but their signicance is denoted by asterisks in
columns for female matches.
For all tests,* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
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Table A1: Behavior in the Games, Conditional on Match and Observables
Dummy for invest Amount Expected Amount Sent
in Trust Game Back in Trust Game in Dictator Game
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
HighSESplayer x MidSESpartner 0.009 0.033 -17.59 -6.26 5.73 12.09
(0.043) (0.050) (14.15) (16.14) (7.49) (8.55)
HighSESplayer x (MidSESpartner x female) -0.084* -0.085* -3.60 -3.31 -9.85 -10.65
(0.051) (0.050) (16.41) (16.41) (8.69) (8.68)
HighSESplayer x Madrassapartner -0.060 -0.026 -62.90*** -49.43** -9.22 -2.10
(0.042) (0.048) (13.53) (15.53) (7.17) (8.22)
HighSESplayer x HighSESpartner -0.117** -0.089* -41.66** -29.95* -24.18*** -17.80**
(0.042) (0.048) (13.71) (15.64) (7.26) (8.28)
HighSESplayer x (HighSESpartner x female) 0.043 0.050 11.04 12.22 -7.88 -8.55
(0.051) (0.051) (16.51) (16.54) (8.74) (8.75)
MidSESplayer x MidSESpartner -0.164** -0.145** -26.16 -15.84 -41.52*** -38.91***
(0.053) (0.056) (17.18) (18.30) (9.10) (9.69)
MidSESplayer x (MidSESpartner x female) 0.002 0.000 -36.62* -37.23* -15.72 -16.52
(0.067) (0.067) (21.63) (21.65) (11.48) (11.48)
MidSESplayer x HighSESpartner -0.233*** -0.208*** -71.58*** -60.86*** -33.88*** -31.01**
(0.052) (0.055) (16.79) (17.86) (8.93) (9.49)
MidSESplayer x (HighSESpartner x female) 0.132** 0.129** 23.91 23.41 7.87 7.59
(0.066) (0.066) (21.44) (21.44) (11.45) (11.44)
MidSESplayer x Madrassapartner -0.120** -0.097* -42.77** -31.95* -21.35** -18.89**
(0.051) (0.054) (16.57) (17.70) (8.77) (9.37)
Madrassaplayer x MidSESpartner 0.030 0.034 -1.04 -0.361 13.69** 13.84**
(0.039) (0.039) (12.75) (12.77) (6.72) (6.73)
Madrassaplayer x (MidSESpartner x female) -0.134** -0.144** 27.09* 25.60 -9.71 -10.51
(0.049) (0.049) (16.09) (16.14) (8.47) (8.49)
Madrassaplayer x HighSESpartner 0.049 0.053 -0.506 -0.050 11.64* 12.16*
(0.037) (0.037) (12.09) (12.11) (6.41) (6.42)
Madrassaplayer x (HighSESpartner x female) -0.019 -0.024 21.14 19.37 -8.32 -8.78
(0.042) (0.042) (13.62) (13.63) (7.20) (7.20)
Middle Income -0.005 -4.45 -3.23
(0.024) (7.98) (4.22)
High Income -0.019 -8.19 -10.16*
(0.030) (9.93) (5.26)
Ownership Index (0-8) 0.006 2.00 0.315
(0.005) (1.66) (0.879)
Age 0.010** 1.61 1.49**
(0.003) (1.05) (0.556)
Middle Religiosity 0.002 2.26 0.829
(0.023) (7.44) (3.94)
High Religiosity 0.041 19.41** -0.877
(0.027) (8.67) (4.59)
Risk general (0-10) 0.008* 0.843 -0.932
(0.005) (1.54) (0.815)
Constant 0.783*** 0.500*** 404.73*** 349.18*** 175.48*** 147.03***
(0.023) (0.080) (7.57) (26.28) (4.01) (13.95)
Number of Observations 2299 2299 2289 2289 2289 2289
a OLS regression of dummy for investment in trust game.
b OLS regression of amount sent in dictator game (Rs. 0- 400).
c OLS regression of amount expected back from partner in the trust game (Rs. 0-900).
Standard errors in parentheses. *p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01.
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Table A2: Female StudentsBehavior and Expectations
Matched with
HighSES MidSES
Male Female Male Female
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A: Proportion who Send Money in the Trust Game
HighSES Female 0.575 0.638 0.737 0.758
MidSES Female 0.632 0.429** 0.352 0.491
Panel B: Amount Expected Back from Match out of Rs.900
HighSES Female
Mean 365.0 313.8 334.2 365.2
Prop. expect >Rs. 200 0.900 0.787 0.895 0.879
MidSES Female
Mean 357.0 328.6 316.7 331.1
Prop. expect >200 0.965 0.804 0.815 0.868
Panel C: Mean Amount Sent in the Dictator Game
HighSES Female 164.4 172.3 176.3 192.4
MidSES Female 153.9 124.9 111.5 137.7
HighSES Female N 40 47 57 33
MidSES Female N 57 56 54 53
Table reports pairwise t-tests between having a match with HighSES Male vs
HighSES Female, and between having a match with MidSES Male vs MidSES Female.
P-values for these tests not reported, but their signicance is denoted by asterisks in
columns for female matches. For all tests,* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
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